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conditions: (1) given the set of actions of the others (no matter what they are), the individual is better off doing A rather than B; and (2) given the choice between everyone doing A and everyone doing B, each individual prefers the latter to the former.3
Given the two features noted of the preference pattern, certain results follow immediately. In particular the following three.
1. Pareto-inferior outcome: In the absence of collusion, each individual will prefer to do A rather than B, for no matter what the others do each is himself better off doing A. However, the outcome, viz., A by all, will be regarded as strictly worse by each than the alternative B by all. Thus the outcome is Pareto-inferior, and will be rejected by everyone in a referendum.
2. Strict dominance of individual strategy: The atomistic result is completely independent of the individuals' expectations of other people's action. Irrespective of each person's expectations of the others' actions, each prefers to do A, i.e., the strategy of doing A strictly dominates over the alternative. Thus we do not have to make any assumption about the individual's behavior when faced with uncertainty and conflict, with which much of game theory is concerned.
3. Need for enforcement: Even if the policy of everyone doing B was adopted by resolution, this would not come about (assuming self-seeking) except through compulsory enforcement. Everyone would like the others to do B, while he himself does A, so that even if a contract is arrived at, it will be in the interest of each to break it.
It is easy to check that in the special case when there are only two individuals, the above corresponds exactly to the game of prisoners' dilemma. In fact with N = 2, the conditions (1) and (2) on the preference pattern give a complete strict ordering of the individuals over the entire field of possible outcomes, which consists of four alternatives.5 We shall, however, stick to the N-person version, and call it the "isolation paradox," 6 The savings problem is only a special application of this. Suppose B stands for the policy of saving one more unit for the sake of the future of the community, and A for not doing it. Given the action of all others, each individual is better off not doing the additional unit of saving himself. Hence nobody will, but everyone would have preferred one more unit of saving by each than by none. This is the essence of the problem discussed by Marglin and myself.7
Consider now a somewhat different preference pattern. Let the individuals continue to hold (2), but let (1) be modified. In the special case when everyone else does B, the individual now prefers to do B himself. Excepting this special case, the individual continues to prefer doing A to B no matter what the others do, given their action.8 This is a near-cousin of the isolation paradox, but differs from it in some of the main results. Result (II), i.e., strict dominance no longer holds. Expectations about other people's behavior must be brought in. If it is expected that the others will all do B, then this one would prefer to do B also; otherwise he may do A. Result (I) needs some modification also. If everyone has implicit faith in everyone else doing the "right" thing, viz., B, then it will be in everyone s interest to do the right thing also. Then the outcome need not be Pareto-inferior.9 However, if each individual feels that the others are going to let him down, that is not do B, then he too may do A rather than B, and the outcome will be Pareto-inferior.
Result (III) does not hold any longer. Given that each individual has complete assurance that the other will do B, there is no problem of compulsory enforcement. Unlike in the case of the isolation paradox, it is not in the individual's interest to break the contract of everyone doing B. In this case assurance is sufficient and enforcement is unnecessary, and we shall refer to this case as that of the "assurance problem." These two problems have often been confused with each other. Marglin's and my argument for the inoptimality of market savings is based on the assumption of a situation of the type of the isolation paradox. This problem however, has been identified with Vickrey's analysis I of "the interdependence of the transfers of different donors," where "an individual might be willing to make a gift to one of his fellows if he knew that others were doing so even if he would not make the gift on his own." 2 This last is, however, a case of the assurance problem. In our case an individual will not do the saving even if "he knew that others were doing so," and this makes the inoptimality of the market result certain, which it is not in Vickrey's case.
The difference is a simple one when viewed in the context of game theory. In the assurance problem with which Vickrey is concerned,4 everyone doing the "right" thing, i.e., B, is an "equilibrium point," 5 whereas in Marglin's case and in mine, this is definitely not so. Baumol's discussion of the optimum savings problem also fits in with the assurance problem, rather than with the isolation paradox, and it rests on an interdependence due to the indivisibility of public projects. The effect of trying to save alone for the sake of the future generation is "negligible," so that the individual, though endowed with altruism, does not do this, "except if he has grounds for assurance that others, too, will act in a manner designed to promote the future welfare of the community." 6 In the case of the isolation paradox, however, the individual will not do the saving even with the assurance. gain in physical terms is (N . k) for the future generation as a whole, and let the proportion of that enjoyed by one's own heirs be h; the appropriate assumptions for h will be discussed presently. However, the net gain G(s) from the social contract, as viewed by any individual, will be of the general form: (6) G(s) N * k * h y+ N * k(l-h)a-1 -(N-1)p . We can now examine what conditions have to be satisfied for the isolation paradox to hold. Note that (5) indicates the weak form of the preference relation (1). Since we are starting from an atomistic market equilibrium, people, in isolation from the others, do not want to save more than they are doing already. Strictly speaking they should be indifferent between A and B, since the net gain from the change is exactly nil, but we can assume that they prefer not to save when there is no net gain. For condition (2) to hold, we need G(s) > 0, i.e., everyone prefers B (saving) by each rather than A (not saving) by each. (7) is consistent with (5), we have the isolation paradox holding, and people are willing to join in the contract to save but not do so individually. To get this result, the assumption that was made by Marglin and myself has been found to be unacceptable by many, viz., that individuals do not discriminate between their own heirs and the rest of the future generation, i.e., y a. As can be readily checked, exactly the same formula holds if X = h = 0, i.e., if the fruits of my saving (both in individualistic saving and social contract) accrue to the future generation-in general and not to my own heirs. Neither, I agree, is a good assumption, and it will be shown presently that neither is necessary. But before that, the consequence of this assumption, however bad, can be checked immediately. Then from (5), k -and condition (7) reduces to: a (7.1) 1 >,/.
The result is independent of the value of N, provided, of course, N > 1. It is quite reasonable to assume that A < 1, i.e., I value my consumption more than that of my other contemporaries. In a closely-reasoned note on this problem, commenting on Marglin's paper, Lind has suggested an alternative set of assumptions. In effect, he assumes that the individual can pass on (if he chooses) all the fruits of his own saving to his own heir without any part of it going to others in the future generation. Then:
A 1, h -L and k =-, so that (7) reduces to:
We cannot be so sure that (7.2) will hold as (7.1). If (-) > /3~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~B (-) , the individuals will be willing to join the contract; and if a (-) < (-), the individuals will not be willing to do so. Indeed, y a if the latter condition held, it would be easy to show that they will be prepared to join a contract to reduce savings; this too fits the isolation paradox, except it now runs the other way, with B standing for reducing the saving by one unit each, and A as before. In between these values lies the case where everything is fine with atomistic allocation, and the case of (-) (A) can be seen to be
Y a one where my relative evaluation of your heir's consumption (a) and your consumption (/3), exactly corresponds to your relative evaluation of your heir's consumption (y) vis-a-vis your own (1). Lind finds this a "reasonable" assumptions
The difficulty with Lind's assumption of the balance of emotions is that it makes insufficient allowance for the personal nature of egoism. My egoism might not extend as much to my heirs vis-A-vis yours, as it applies to me personally vis-a'-vis you. The longer the distance in time that we consider the more is this likely to be the case. So that (I) > 1y does not seem to be a particularly bad assumption. However, for the sake of argument, let us grant this balance of emotions, and assume that y is exactly equal to (a), no more and no less. There is the further question of A = 1, which is the only case Lind discusses. If it is assumed that there is a gap between the marginal productivity of capital and the rate of interest, 9. Lind, op. cit. pp. 341-42, 345. In commenting on my Economic Journal paper on the subject, the same suggestion was made in a personal communication (dated April 4, 1962) by the late Sir Dennis Tobertson.
1. In much of the literature on economic development, it is conventional to assume that the market wage rate is above the social opportunity cost of labor, which will also make X < 1, since the marginal benefits to the owners of capital will fall short of the marginal benefits to the community. This is a sufficient assumption for X < 1, but, of course, not necessary.
A must be below 1.1 But even when there is no such gap, in a society with taxation this will happen again. Even if we assume, in a competitive dream world, that no one is prevented from enjoying the full "return" of his own investment through taxes, this does not rule out taxes, such as estate duties, that apply to unrequitted transfers.
And these too will make X < 1. This is not to say that Marglin's to the same value. However, the difference between the private and the social rate of discount continues to hold, except when the knife-edge balance happens to occur. This is the dual to the problem of the optimum rate of saving, and (7.1) can be seen to be sufficient for the social rate to be below the private rate of discount. Representing the private rate of discount by r, it is seen from (5) and (9) all in the market mechanism to guarantee that we shall indeed have one of these critical pairs holding. Of course, it can happen, but it will be an accidental outcome.
Marglin's case can be obtained from ( 
IV. RICH THEY, POOR US
Finally, the point has been raised whether the isolation paradox in savings is at all likely to arise when it is borne in mind that the future generation is going to be a great deal more wealthy than the present generation. In the determination of the social rate of discount, this will undoubtedly be an important consideration. This can be checked readily by looking at (9), where the wealth of the future generation will tend to make the values of y and a relatively lower. However, will this affect the condition for the isolation paradox to hold? Not at all! It is seen from (7.1) and (7.2) that a proportionate fall in y and a (the values attached to the consumption of the future generation) vis-a-vis the values attached to the consumption of members of the present generation, will not make any difference to the fulfillment of the conditions. The explanation is simple; the fact that the future generation will be wealthier has already been taken into account in the atomistic allocation of resources, and the average wealth of the future generation vis-a-vis that of the present generation does not affect the relative profitability of atomistic allocation and the social contract.
Indeed substituting the value of k from (5) into (7), we find that (7) is equivalent to: In this general condition a proportionate change in the values of y and a would leave the fulfillment of the inequality entirely unchanged. Exactly the same is true, naturally, in the dual to this problem, i.e., in the difference between the private and the social rate of discounts. A proportionate change in y and a will leave condition (10) exactly the same, as is obvious from its form.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In Section I two specific problems concerning individual and social actions were studied. One, the isolation paradox, is an Nperson extension of the two-person non-zero-sum game of the prisoners" dilemma. Here each individual has a strictly dominant strategy, and the pursuit of this by each produces an overall result that is Pareto-inferior. Individuals can do better than this by collusion, but the collusive solution requires enforcement.
The second, the assurance problem, which is sometimes confused with the first, has a different analytical structure and imply different policy questions. Here there is no strictly dominant strategy, and one of the equilibrium points in the noncooperative game may be Pareto-optimal. Whether this will be the outcome of the noncooperative game or whether the outcome will be Paretoinferior depends on what each individual expects about the others' action. To get out of the problem all that is necessary is that each individual is assured that the others are doing the "right" thing, and then it is in one's own interest also to do the "right" thing. No enforcement is necessary.
Marglin's and my discussion of the inoptimality of market savings corresponds to the isolation paradox, whereas that of Baumol, and of Vickrey (in the context of philanthropy), corresponds to the assurance problem. The distinction is important analytically as well as for policy decisions.
In the last three sections, Marglin's and my formulation of the problem of the inoptimality of market savings was examined as an application of the paradox of isolation. It should be conceded immediately that if one is ready to make some rather special assump-tions, the problem can in fact be assumed away. Lind's conditions of balance (y --, and X = 1) achieve this,5 and, as we have seen, so does a family of pairs of values of (y, A). However, there is nothing in the market mechanism that will ensure this achievement. This inoptimality of the market mechanism, and the possibility of a social contract by which everyone will agree to do something he would not be ready to do individually, is not a surprising result when viewed in the context of games such as the prisoners' dilemma. It is a paradox only as an apparent one, as most paradoxes are. Even from the point of view of usual theories of optimum allocation through decentralized decisions, the result need not be viewed as particularly contrary, for the basis of it lies in an external concern for members of the future generation vis-a-vis those of the present.
If Finally, the question of the future generation being, on the average, much richer than the present generation was studied as grounds for an objection that has been raised against the chances of the isolation paradox.6 It was shown that a change in the average 5. Lind's condition is not, of course, in conflict with the claim that "this possibility of the apparent paradox is present whenever his relative valuation of others' consumption is such that he would prefer them to sacrifice some consumption for the future generations" (Sen, op. cit., p. 488). With y =a-and X 1, the condition is not met, and the consequence does not, naturally, follow. See also Marglin, op. cit., pp. 100-2.
6. TulLock, op. cit., pp. 333-35; Harberger, op. cit., Sec. 4. Harberger has a further argument which we have not discussed. "The third argument (c), best reflected by Sen and Marglin, smacks of charity. . . . My reaction to this is simple: any individual who wants to help others, and to make sure that his wealth of the future generation vis-a-vis that of the present generation, bringing about a change in a and r in the same proportion, leave the possibility of the isolation paradox completely unchanged.
DELHI SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS UNIVERSITY OF DELHI
contribution is not dissipated, can do so by selecting one or more people of the present generation to help" (pp. 14-15). This seems a good way of working off one's irrepressible urge towards charity, but surely this need not cure the misallocation in the rate of saving.
